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We analyze potential labor supply effects of a shift from the current German system of joint 
taxation of married couples to a system of limited real income splitting on the basis of an 
econometric household labor supply model embedded in a tax-benefit model. Our simulation 
results show relatively small labor supply effects of a shift from the current system to one of 
limited real income splitting system. In the benchmark scenario of a shift to separate taxation 
labor supply of wives would increase substantially in west Germany, while a significant 
number of husbands would drop out of the labor force. 
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of this paper. 1 Introduction 
The joint taxation of married couples in Germany has been a controversial issue in practical 
fiscal and social policy for some time. There has also been a long-standing debate among 
economists about the normative rationale as well as allocation and distribution effects of the 
special taxation of married couples in Germany, known as “income splitting”. This principle 
means that the income tax of a married couple is calculated by applying the tax function to 
half of the added incomes of the spouses, and this amount is then doubled to determine the tax 
amount of the couple. Under the German system of progressive taxation this implies that the 
amount of the income tax of a married couple may be lower than the tax the same couple 
would have to pay if both spouses were taxed individually according to the principle of 
separate taxation. The difference in the tax under these two principles depends both on the 
level of household income and the distribution of incomes between the two spouses. In 
popular German discussion, this difference is termed the “splitting advantage” of the joint 
taxation of married couples.  
There are two prevalent criticisms of this alleged “splitting advantage”: First it is seen 
as a subsidy to married couples with the traditional division of labor within the household, 
where the wife as the secondary earner stays at home. In this view, the relatively low labor 
force participation rate of married women in Germany is closely related to the negative labor 
supply incentives for second earners implied by the tax system.
1 From a social policy 
perspective, critics also point out that income splitting is not an adequate means of family 
policy as it does not subsidize households with children but married couples, while 
increasingly these two groups cease to coincide. In contrast, the majority view among public 
finance experts seems to be that there is no “splitting advantage” at all. Rather, the difference 
in the amount of taxes paid by married couples is considered to be the logical consequence of 
the system of progressive taxation, given the widely agreed normative rules that the tax 
system should not discriminate against marriage and, at the same time, should be neutral with 
respect to the distribution of incomes within the household (see, e.g., Spahn, Kaiser and 
Kassella, 1992, Homburg, 2000).  
In this paper, our focus is on the positive issue of the negative incentives of the current 
German system of income splitting on labor supply of wives.  In particular, we will simulate  
                                                 
1   For example, comparing the Swedish system of separate taxation of married couples with the German system 
of income splitting, Gustafsson (1992: 61) states: “The German wife, on the other hand, has to earn enough 
to offset the marriage gain, before she contributes to family income, and marginal earnings of the second 
wage earner are hit by a high tax rate”. 
  1the labor supply effects of a shift to some other system of taxation. To this end, we analyze 
two hypothetical reforms: (i) a shift to a system of individual income taxation, and (ii) the 
proposal of “limited real income splitting”. For both political and constitutional reasons, it 
seems very unlikely that individual taxation for spouses will be introduced in Germany. The 
second reform proposal, which limits the amount of the “splitting advantage”, has been 
discussed during the last election campaign by the ruling coalition and it is likely that this 
proposal will show up in the future.  
To simulate the labor supply effects of these hypothetical reforms, we develop a 
microsimulation model which integrates an empirical household labor supply model into a 
detailed tax-benefit model based on the German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP). The labor 
supply model is based on the hypothesis that both spouses jointly maximize a utility function 
in the arguments leisure of both spouses and net household income. This “household utility” 
model differs in important ways from previous studies on the labor supply effects of 
household taxation in Germany. In these studies, the specification of the household labor 
supply model is based on the ”male chauvinist” assumption:  that is, the wife is assumed to 
adjust her labor supply to that of the husband who, in turn, does not care about his wife’s 
labor supply behavior. We believe that the behavioral assumption underlying our econometric 
labor supply model is a better description of actual behavior than the one implied by the 
“male chauvinist” labor supply model. In particular, our model allows us to estimate the 
effects of a change in household taxation on the labor supply of both spouses, whereas 
previous studies have only looked at the wife’s labor supply decision. Furthermore, we also 
estimate the effects of the change in taxation on both spouses’ labor force participation and 
the hours decision simultaneously.  
In the next section, we briefly describe the German system of taxation of married 
couples and define the so-called “splitting advantage” referred to above. We also briefly 
summarize the empirical studies on the potential labor supply effects of reforms in household 
taxation in Germany relevant for our study. In section 3, we present the econometric 
specification of our labor supply model, which we then use to simulate the shift from the 
current system of income splitting to the hypothetical benchmark of separate taxation and a 
more realistic “limited real income splitting” scenario. Simulation results for the implied 
income effects (for given labor supply) and the effects of this shift on labor supply in 
Germany are summarized in section 4.  The main results of our study are summarized in the 
concluding section 5.  
 
  22  Distribution and Labor Supply Effects of “Income Splitting“  
To set the scene for our simulation study of the potential labor supply effects of a shift from 
the current German system of income splitting to other forms of household taxation, in the 
following section we briefly describe different income tax regimes for married couples and 
illustrate the “splitting advantage” for the German case. In section 2.2, we briefly summarize 
previous empirical studies on the effects of income splitting on labor supply of married 
women in Germany. 
2.1  Household Taxation, Income Splitting, and the “Splitting Advantage”  
Income tax regimes of European countries differ greatly regarding the tax treatment of 
married couples. In some countries (Sweden, Austria, Great Britain)
2, individuals are taxed 
subject to their own income, independently of their marital status. Other countries, such as 
France, the US, or Germany, treat married couples as a single tax subject and tax the incomes 
of spouses jointly. To avoid the “marriage penalty” that arises in a progressive tax system as a 
consequence of joint taxation, Germany allows income splitting between spouses: The income 
tax of a married couple is calculated by applying the tax function to half of the sum of the 
spouses’ incomes; this amount is then doubled to determine the tax amount of the couple. In 
Figure 1, the German system of joint taxation with income splitting is compared with the 
system of separate taxation and a modified system of separate taxation.  
Figure 1—Income tax regimes for married couples 
Separate taxation: 
T(YH,YW)=t(YH)+t(YW) 
Joint taxation with income splitting: 
T(YH,YW)=2×t[(YH+YW)/2] 
Separate taxation with tax allowance for support payments 
(“limited real income splitting”): 
T(YH,YW)=t(YH−A)+t(YW+A)    with A ≤ |YH − YW| / 2  and  A ≤ some threshold 
with YH   = income husband, YW =income wife, 
           T(.) = income tax charged, t(.) =tax function 
Income splitting guarantees that married couples, given a certain household income, will 
always be charged the same amount of income tax, no matter how income is distributed 
                                                 
2  For a survey on the income tax systems of European countries, see for example Dingeldey (2001). 
  3between husband and wife. It therefore also implies that no married couple will pay higher 
income taxes than a single individual with the same household income. This tax neutrality 
towards the income distribution between spouses, however, leads to non-neutrality towards 
marital status. An unmarried couple could “save” taxes through marriage because of the 
“splitting advantage”.
3 The “splitting advantage” is defined as the difference between the tax 
amount that a married couple pays under income splitting and the amount the same couple 
would pay in case of separate taxation. The amount of this advantage depends on the income 
distribution between husband and wife and on the absolute level of household income. In the 
following figure the splitting advantage is illustrated for the tax function of the years 2002/ 
03
4. 
Figure 2—“Splitting Advantage” for married couples under the current system of income  
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Note:  The first (second) number refers to the husband’s (wife’s) percentage share in the spouses’ joint 
household pre-tax income per year (in €). 
Source:  Calculations by the German Institute of Economic Research (DIW Berlin). 
                                                 
3   As mentioned in the introduction, the connotation of the term „splitting advantage“ is open to question. For a 
discussion of  the impossibility of jointly fulfilling all reasonable objectives on a system of taxing couples, 
see Spahn, Kaiser and Kassella (1992). 
4   In contrast to Germany, in the US the joint taxation of married spouses leads to a “marriage penalty” for some 
couples and a “marriage bonus” for others, depending on household income and on the income distribution 
within the household (see Dickert-Conlin and Houser 1998).  
  4As can be seen from Figure 2, the splitting advantage attains its maximum for single earner 
households. Whith an increasing share of second earner’s income, the splitting advantage 
declines rapidly. In the case of a couple with a pre-tax income of 100,000 € per year, 
according to the tax function of the year 2002/03, the splitting advantage is 9,757 € for a 
single-earner couple. The splitting advantage declines to 5,524 € if the income share of the 
second earner is 10%, given constant household income. For couples with a second-earner 
income share of 30%, the splitting advantage shrinks to 1,618 €. On the other hand, for a 
given share of second earner’s income, the splitting advantage clearly increases (in absolute 
terms) with increasing pre-tax household income. The relative share of the splitting 
advantage, however, does not follow a monotonic trend. For single-earner households, the 
splitting advantage is 12% of after-tax household income for couples with a pre-tax income of 
50,000 €. This share increases to 14% (pre-tax income of 75,000 €), and declines to 12% for 
households with a pre-tax income of 125,000 €. The upper limit of the splitting advantage is 
9,899 € according to the tax tariff function of 2002/03. It is attained by single-earner 
households with a pre-tax income amounting to twice the income limit after that the highest 
tax rate cuts in. 
One of the reform proposals that has repeatedly been suggested, the so-called “limited 
real income splitting”, leaves the “splitting advantage” for married couples with unequal 
income distribution in place, but reduces its quantitative importance. In this system, married 
couples are taxed separately, but the spouse with higher income can deduct a tax allowance 
for support payments; the second earner has to add this tax allowance to his own taxable 
income (see Figure 1). The tax allowance is limited to 20,000 € per year and cannot exceed 50 
per cent of the difference between the incomes of the spouses
5. Under this regime, income 
differences up to 40,000 € can be balanced in the same way as under the current income 
splitting; only for spouses with income differences above this amount, the “splitting 
advantage” is cut. 
In the following sections, we will analyze two hypothetical reforms of the current 
system of household taxation in Germany, namely (i) a shift to a system of individual income 
taxation, and (ii) the proposal of the limited real income splitting. It seems unlikely, due to 
constitutional arguments, that individual taxation for spouses will be introduced in Germany. 
The second reform proposal, however, has been discussed during the last election campaign 
by the ruling coalition and it seems likely that this proposal will show up again  in the future. 
                                                 
5   It should be noted that without the limitation of the tax allowance, real income splitting would equal the 
current income splitting in Germany. For a discussion hereon, see Homburg (2000). 
  5Before we turn to the simulation of the potential labor supply effects of these proposals, we 
briefly summarize the empirical studies of similar reforms of the system of joint taxation in 
Germany.  
2.2  Labor Supply Effects – Previous Empirical Studies for Germany 
There are only a few empirical studies that analyze the effects of a reform of household 
taxation on labor supply of married women and on the income distribution in Germany 
(Wagenhals and Kraus 1998, Althammer 2000, Spahn, Kaiser and Kassella 1992, Gustafsson 
1992). All of these studies are based on the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSOEP) 
and estimate standard labor supply models for married couples, where the focus is on the 
labor supply response of wives to a shift from the system of income splitting to separate 
taxation. All these studies are based on the so-called “male chauvinist” assumption 
(Killingsworth, 1983).  That is, it is assumed that the wife’s labor supply depends on her own 
marginal net wage rate, which is a function of the gross wage rate and the tax function. Policy 
variations are simulated by a change in the tax function that determines the wife’s marginal 
net wage rate. The husband’s labor supply decision is assumed to be exogenously given for 
the labor supply decision of his wife. 
Wagenhals and Kraus (1998) analyze numerous policy variations, amongst others 
individual taxation, income splitting with splitting divisors of 1.6 and 1.8, some variations of 
limited real income splitting, and family splitting
6. For the case of a shift to individual 
taxation (which is the only policy reform that is comparable to the simulated reform proposals 
presented in our paper), Wagenhals and Kraus calculate an increase of the female labor force 
participation rate of 26 percentage points (from 59% under the status quo to 85% under 
separate taxation).  
Althammer (2000) also simulates income tax policy variations on the basis of GSOEP 
data from the year 1996. Policy shifts to family splitting and various sorts of limited real 
income splitting are analyzed, with all policy variations modelled to be neutral in tax 
revenues. The wife’s labor supply is explained by the marginal net wage rate and other net 
household income. Therefore, policy shifts are simulated by changes in the marginal wage 
rate via changing the tax function, assuming that the wife’s income is taxed as the secondary 
income in the high-tax bracket under the current system of joint taxation. In case of a shift to 
                                                 
6   In the case of family splitting, the splitting divisor depends on the number of children in the household. 
 
  6limited real income splitting (with different tax allowances than the proposal studied in our 
paper), the female participation rate increases by 0.7 percentage points, from 69.5% to 70.2%. 
Labor supply effects of a change to individual taxation and to limited real income 
splitting are also studied in Spahn, Kaiser and Kassella (1992). As in Althammer (2000), these 
policy variations are set up to be neutral in tax revenues. Female labor supply is modelled as a 
linear function of marginal net wage rate and other net household income. In case of a policy 
shift to a form of limited real income splitting, female labor supply, measured in total hours 
worked by year, increases by 11.8%. The simulated policy reform, however, is not directly 
comparable to the one we present below, because it includes higher child allowances to 
achieve revenue neutrality and higher tax allowances for support payments. 
Gustafsson (1992) analyzes the labor supply reaction of German women in the case that 
the Swedish income tax system (individual taxation) were to be implemented in Germany. 
Female labor supply is estimated by applying a logit model with two alternatives, namely 
wife’s labor supply of 10 hours per week and wife’s labor supply of 40 hours per week. These 
alternatives are compared to the case that the wife does not work at all. Independent variables 
in the model are the pre-tax wage rate, net average wage rate, given the hours worked per 
week, and net household income in case the wife is not working. The result, based on GSOEP 
data from 1984, is an increase of the female participation rate of  almost 10 percentage points 
(from 50.3 to 60%) in case of the introduction of the Swedish income tax system in Germany. 
Overall, the majority of these studies finds relatively large labor supply effects of a shift 
from the current German system of joint taxation with income splitting to some form of 
separate taxation or limited real income splitting.  These effects were derived under the 
assumption of the “male chauvinist” model. We doubt that this hypothesis adequately 
describes household labor supply in Germany. Furthermore, the studies reviewed above do 
not take into account that a change in household taxation may not only affect wives’ but also 
husbands’ labor supply, presumably in an opposite direction. In the next section, we therefore 
develop an econometric model of household labor supply based on less restrictive behavioral 
assumptions which also allows us to simulate the effects of changes in household taxation on 
husbands’ labor supply behavior. 
 
3  Econometric Specification  
In this section, we extend previous work by Steiner (2000) and integrate a household labor 
supply model with a tax-benefit simulation model. Given the complexities of the German tax 
and income transfer systems and the existence of means-tested social transfers, a detailed 
  7specification of the household’s budget constraint seems crucial when analyzing the incentive 
effects of houshold taxation, and the joint filing of taxes of couples in particular.  
3.1  The Household Labor Supply Model 
There are various specifications of empirical household labor supply models in the literature 
(for a recent summary see Blundell und MaCurdy, 1999). The most commonly used 
specifications are the so-called “male chauvinist” model and the household utility model. As it 
was already mentioned in section 2 above, in the former model it is assumed that the wife 
takes the husband’s labor supply as given in her own labor supply decision, whereas the 
husband does not take his wife’s labor supply decision into account in deciding on his own 
labor supply. In contrast, the household utility (HU) model is based on the assumption that 
both spouses jointly maximize a utility function in the arguments leisure of both spouses and 
net household income. In our view, the HU model is a more adequate description of actual 
household behavior in Germany.
7  For the specification of the male chauvinist model, a net 
wage rate for each spouse has to be defined. Under the German system of joint taxation, 
however, this definition is not possible without critical assumptions. The above-cited studies 
assume that the net wage of the wife is the one which is obtained when applying the high tax 
bracket for secondary earners. As a consequence, the husband’s income, which enters the 
labor supply decision of the wife as “other income”, is relatively high. However, this 
distribution of taxes between spouses is only an assumption. If equal tax brackets were 
assumed, the net wage rate of the wife would rise, while the husband’s income (which is the 
wife’s “other income”) would fall. In the “male chauvinist” specification of labor supply, the 
effects of a reform of the splitting regime are driven by the change in the net wage rates. The 
results are therefore very sensitive to the critical assumption on the choice of the tax brackets 
of the spouses. 
To make the household labor supply model tractable, we assume that the labor supply 
decisions of the household head and the spouse can be separated from the labor supply 
decisions of all other household members. That is, it will be assumed that other household 
members’ labor supply does not affect the spouses’ joint labor supply decision.  
                                                 
7   The more recent „collective“ models of household  labor supply do not specify a common utility function of 
the household but, starting from individual utility function and taking into account strategic interactions 
between the spouses, derive optimal (pareto-efficient) sharing rules for income and leisure within the 
household (see, e.g., Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999, section 7.2 for a summary). The empirical identification 
of this type of model is very demanding and, so far, the application of this approach to the empirical analyses 
of practical policy problems has been rather limited.  
  8In contrast to traditional labor supply studies, we model hours supplied by the 
household as a categorical rather than as a metric variable.  This form of modelling takes into 
account the fact that hours of work are heavily concentrated at particular hours, such as 0, 15, 
20 and 40 hours for women, and zero and 40 hours for men.  This peculiar hours distribution 
cannot adequately be approximated by specifying a continuous hours distribution. Second, the 
specification of hours categories reduces measurement errors in the number of hours actually 
worked.  Thirdly, and most importantly, the specification of a relatively small number of 
hours categories leads to a big reduction in the computational burden of calculating the 
potential net household income at each possible hours choice.  This simplification, in fact, is a 
perequisite for an adequate specification of the budget contstraint given the complexities of 
the German tax-benefit system.  
The household’s labor supply decision is modelled by a utility function which is 
assumed to depend on the leisure time of the male (Lm) and the female (Lf ) spouse as well as 
on real net household income (Y).  Following van Soest  (1995), we assume that the 
household’s utility index for a particular hours category, k, can be modelled by the following 
translog function: 
(1)  () kk k k k Ux x A x x k β ε ′′ =+ + , 
where x= (y, lm, lf)’.  The components of x are the (natural) logs of net household income, 
leisure of the husband and the wife, respectively.  These components enter the utility function 
(1) with linear, quadratic and cross terms between the spouses’ leisure terms and household 
income.  The matrix A, with elements αij, i, j = (1, 2, 3), contains the coefficients referring to 
the non-linear terms, the vector βj ,  j = (1, 2, 3), the corresponding coefficients of the linear 
terms.  ε  is a stochastic error term accounting for factors affecting the household’s utility 
other than leisure and income.  The distribution of this error term will be specified below. 
The advantage of this functional form specification relative to more restrictive 
specifications of preferences, such as the Cobb-Douglas or CES utility functions, is its 
flexibility.  In particular, equation (1) allows for the dependence of the utility of one spouse’s 
hours of leisure on the other spouse’s leisure as well as the utility of each spouse’s leisure to 
depend on the level of net household income. 
In the HU model, the utility index should be concave in household income and, for 
given household income, be increasing in both spouses’ leisure time (provided working hours 
were initially positive).  Moreover, the first derivative of the utility index with respect to 
leisure time should, ceteris paribus, be positive for both spouses, provided leisure is a normal 
  9good, while the second derivative is expected to be negative.  The cross-substitution effect 
between the two spouses’ leisure time is theoretically ambiguous. That is,  


































































These theoretical implications can be tested by calculating respective derivatives of the utility 
index for each household evaluated at the parameter estimates from the econometric model 
described below. The sign of the cross effects depend on whether the two spouses’ leisure 
times are substitutes or complements. The latter seems more likely to be the case because 
leisure spent with the spouse is probably valued higher than an equivalent amount of time 
spent alone.  Of course, this ultimately is an empirical question which can only be resolved on 
the basis of econometric work. 
Given the assumption of joint maximization of household utility, the household will 
choose hours category k if, in probability terms, the associated utility index, Uk exceeds the 
utility in any other possible alternative l, i.e.: 
(3)  () ( ) () k l l l l k k k l k x Ax x x Ax x P U U P ε ε β β − > + − + = > ' ' ' ' ) ( 
To obtain an estimable econometric specification of the household labor supply model 
described in the previous section, we have to specify a distribution of the stochastic 
component of the utility function, i.e.  k ε .  Assuming that  k ε  is distributed identically across 
all hours categories according to an extreme-value distribution, the difference of the utility 
index between any two hours categories follows a logistic distribution.  As it is well known 
(McFadden, 1973), under this distributional assumption the probability of choosing 






















  10where the summation sign is defined over all possible alternatives, i.e. hours categories.
8  
For given levels of income and leisure for both spouses, household utility also depends 
on certain household characteristics, such as the age and the health status of both spouses as 
well as the number and age of children in the household.  This dependence is accounted for in 
the model by specifying the parameters βj  as functions of these variables.  The specification 
of these functions may differ by gender, as it seems likely that children in the household have 
different effects on men’s and women’s leisure time. 
As specified here, the CLM only identifies parameters of variables which vary between 
alternatives. Variables with no variation across alternatives drop out of the estimation due to 
the fact that only differences in the utility index between alternatives are compared here.  
Hence, the estimation of income effects relies on the differences in the level of net household 
income between the hypothetically chosen hours categories rather than on the income level 
itself.  Characteristics specific to the household or the spouses, like the presence of children, 
disability or age are identified by the assumption that their effects on household utility depend 
on the hours category. 
3.2  Data and Variables  
Estimation of the labor supply model is on data from the most recent wave (2002) of the 
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP).
9 The GSOEP is a representative sample of private 
households living in Germany with detailed information on household incomes, hours worked 
and household structure. This information is required for both the estimation of the labor 
supply model and the calculation of hypothetical levels of net household incomes relevant for 
the simulation of income tax changes. The analysis is restricted to household members who 
can be expected to vary their labor supply to changes in potential net income. Hence, 
pensioners, students in full-time education and women on maternity leave are not included in 
the sample.  The self-employed are also excluded because their labor supply behavior can be 
expected to differ qualitatively.  Furthermore, households with missing values in any of the 
variables entering the calculation of the net household income in alternative hours categories 
had to be dropped from the sample. Since we use mostly retrospective information on the 
                                                 
8  The assumption that the error terms follow an extreme value distribution is rather restrictive and results in the 
property of the independence of irrelevant alternatives. Random coefficient models allow for unobserved 
heterogeneity and therefore circumvent this ‘IIA-assumption’. Haan (2004) estimated several labor supply 
models with the same data set that we use and showed that the results (in terms of labor supply elasticities) 
from a random coefficients model did not differ significantly from the results from a conditional logit model. 
9   A description of the GSOEP can be downloaded from www.diw.de/soep; see also Haisken-DeNew and Frick 
(2001). 
  11income variables, the simulations refer to the year 2001.  Descriptive statistics on some key 
variables of our model are given in Table A1 in the appendix. 
Hours Categories 
The GSOEP contains information on the number of weekly hours actually worked in the 
month before the interview, the number of hours „normally“ worked and actually paid 
overtime hours.  The hours variable used here includes paid overtime, i.e. the number of 
actual hours worked in the reference month.  This is the number of normal hours plus paid 
overtime hours.  If a person working overtime hours did not answer the question whether 
overtime hours are compensated by cash or by shorter working time later on, it was assumed 
that half of the difference between actual hours worked and average normal hours will be paid 
(and the other half remunerated by holidays).  This part was added to normal average hours.   
The definition of the hours categories is motivated by both economic considerations and 
the actual distribution of hours in the sample.  Although a relatively fine aggregation of hours 
into categories seems desirable in order to realistically approximate the household’s budget 
constraint, the actual distribution of hours in the sample severely restricts the number of 
possible categories.  In particular, men typically do not work part-time and their actual 
working hours are heavily concentrated between 35 and 40 hours per week. Furthermore, for 
couples the feasible number of categories is not only restricted by the distribution of hours 
within one gender, but by the bivariate distribution of the two spouses’ working hours. The 
actual distribution of households in the sample across hours categories is given in Table 1. 
Table 1—Distribution of households across hours categories 
  Men 
               Hours  0  1 – 40  > 40 
0  177  (4.9)  542  (14.9)  439  (12.1) 
1 – 15  281  (7.7)  172  (4.7) 
16 – 34  82  (2.3)  597  (16.4)  368  (10.1) 















> 40  95  (2.6)  98  (2.7)  120  (3.3) 
Notes:   The first number refers to the absolute frequency in the sample, the second number   
(in parentheses) to the corresponding relative frequency in percent.  
Source:  Own calculations, GSOEP, wave 19 (2002).  
Because of the small number of men working part-time in our sample, only three categories 
could be specified for them, namely: non-employment (unemployment and non-participation 
in the labor force), 1 – 40 hours, and more than 40 hours (overtime). Table 1  shows that 
about a third (32%) of all wives in the sample living in couple households do not work, 41 % 
  12work part-time (defined as working less than 35 hours a week), and 27% work more than 35 
hours a week, i.e. full-time. About 10% of all husbands in couple households were 
unemployed in 2001. At the same time, more than a third (37%) of all husbands worked 
overtime (more than 40 hours).  In about 3 % of all couple households both spouses worked 
overtime. 
The specification of the econometric model is based on the assumption that each 
household compares the expected utility obtained from net income and the two spouses’ 
leisure associated with the choice of a particular hours category.  Here, it is assumed that this 
comparison is based on the average number of hours worked in a particular category. By 
subtracting this number from the maximum time budget the household allocates to market 
work, the average number of hours of leisure corresponding to the choice of a hours category 
is obtained.  For the empirical analysis, the maximum time budget allocated to market work is 
assumed the same for each household member and is set to 80 hours per week.  To test the 
sensitivity of estimation results with respect to this assumption, the model was also estimated 
with alternative values for the maximum time budget.  Estimation results proved rather 
insensitive to realistic changes in the value chosen for this parameter.  For example, changing 
the maximum number from 80 to 60 hours per week had very little effect on the estimation 
results.
10  
Net Household Income 
The derivation of net household income is based on a detailed tax-benefit simulation model 
which includes all relevant components of the German tax and transfer system.
11  As regards 
the calculation of taxable income, earnings from dependent employment, income from capital 
(interest), property rents, and other income are added to get gross household income.  For the 
great majority of households the most important income component is earnings from 
dependent employment.  For employed people, information on gross monthly earnings in the 
month before the interview is collected in the GSOEP.  This information together with the 
hours information described above is used to calculate gross hourly wages.  Hypothetical 
monthly earnings for each of the hours categories defined in the previous section are 
calculated by multiplying gross hourly earnings by the respective average number of working 
hours in each category. For couples, gross monthly earnings of the household are the sum of 
the two spouses (hypothetical) earnings in each hours category.  For employed persons, it is 
                                                 
10  van Soest (1995) reports a similar result in his study for the Netherlands. 
11   A description of this tax-benefit simulation model can be obtained from the authors upon request.  
  13assumed that the individual gross hourly wage in their actual hours category would be the 
same in each hours category.  For persons not employed in the month preceding the interview, 
gross hourly wages are estimated on the basis of empirical wage equations. Due to item non-
response wages are also missing for a non-negligible share of employed persons, for whom 
hourly wages are imputed on the basis of these wage equations
12.  
Given (estimated) hourly wages, potential monthly earnings associated with each hours 
category are calculated for each individual in the sample by simply multiplying the hourly 
wage with the average number of hours worked per month in each category.  Potential gross 
earnings of each household in each of the 13 hours categories are obtained by simply adding 
both spouses potential earnings for all categories with positive hours.  These estimates of 
potential monthly earnings are the starting point for the calculation of net household income.   
Employees’ social security contributions and the income tax are deducted from gross 
household income and social transfers are added to it to get net household income.  Social 
transfers include child allowances, child-rearing benefits, educational allowances for students 
and apprentices, unemployment compensation, the housing allowance, and social assistance.  
Taxable income is calculated by deducting certain expenses from gross household income.  
The income tax is calculated by applying the income tax formula prevailing in 2001 to taxable 
income.   
Income from self-employment is not taken into account here, because the self-employed 
and their relatives are not included in the analysis.  Information on income from capital and 
rents is directly taken from the respective questions in the GSOEP.  The potential problem of 
unreliable answers to questions on capital income does not seem too severe in the present 
context because it would affect estimation results only to the extent that capital income varies 
with the choice of a particular hours category.  However, it may affect the calculation of the 
hypothecial level of means-tested income support and thereby indirectly also the choice 
between employment and non-employment in some cases.   
Other Variables describing Household Preferences 
For various reasons, household preferences for leisure and income may differ substantially 
between east and west Germany as well as between natives and foreigners.  Preferences may 
also differ with respect to other individual and household characteristics, such as age, 
disability and the presence of children in the household.  Given their strong work-orientation 
in the former GDR, east German women may have stronger preferences for work than west 
                                                 
12 Estimation results for these wage equations are available from the authors on request. 
  14German women.  On the other hand, compared to married women of foreign nationality, west 
German women may have a relatively strong work orientation.  In general, it seems very 
likely that households with small children have a stronger preference for “leisure” (non-
market work) than those without children, and that in couple households the dependence of 
leisure on the presence of children also varies by gender.  Also, it seems likely that 
preferences for leisure may also depend on age and on disability status. 
Due to the relatively small number of households in some of the hours categories, 
separate estimation of the labor supply models by region and by nationality is not feasible.  
Structural differences in labor supply behavior between natives and foreigners as well as 
between east and west Germany are therefore accounted for by interaction terms.  These are 
specified as dummy variables for nationality and region on the one hand, and (the logs of) net 
household income and the leisure variables on the other.  Because of the very small numbers 
of foreigners living in east Germany, interaction terms for foreigners refer to west Germany 
only.  The leisure variables are also interacted with age and age squared and dummy variables 
for  disability status and, for women, with dummies for the presence of children differentiated 
by age groups.  
On the basis of the data described above the labor supply model specified in the 
previous section was estimated by the Maximum Likelihood method. Because net household 
income and leisure time of the two spouses enter the household utility function in linear and 
quadratic terms as well as interaction terms between each other, the interpretation of single 
estimated coefficients is not particularly revealing.  Therefore, we calculated wage elasticities 
that can be compared with results from other econometric studies. These elasticities are 




4 Simulation  Results 
Following the discussion in section 2, we simulate two hypothetical alternatives to the current 
system of household taxation in Germany. Although it is very unlikely to be implemented, we 
analyze the income and labor supply effects of a shift to individual taxation as a reference 
case. Secondly, we simulate a shift to the limited real income splitting, which leaves the 
splitting advantage for married couples in place, but reduces its amount for middle- and high-
                                                 
13  Detailed estimation results are available from the authors upon request. 
  15income households.  We first present the income effects of the two policy reforms under the 
assumption of fixed labor supply
14 and then show the simulated labor supply effects.  
4.1  Income Effects with Constant Labor Supply 
The income change for each household depends on the absolute amount of household income 
and on the income distribution between the spouses. Therefore, in Table 2 we present the 
income changes for married couples by the 13 hours categories defined above, by income 
deciles, and by the number of children.  
As expected, income changes are much higher for single-earner couples than for two-
earner couples. For spouses with equal labor force participation, the income change gets very 
small. A shift to individual taxation causes higher differences of the income changes between 
working hours categories than a shift to limited real income splitting. The modified splitting 
reform leaves 50 per cent of all married couples (in eastern Germany even 75 per cent) 
without income change at all. This is a consequence of the possibility to balance income 
inequalities between spouses up to 40,000 € under limited real income splitting.  
Income changes by net household income deciles do not follow a clear pattern, because 
the distribution of incomes between spouses is not taken into account in this depiction. In 
order to isolate this effect on the income change due to the policy shift, Figure 3 presents the 
income changes by share of income of the second earner for households with constant pre-tax 
income. Again, it can be seen that a shift to individual taxation causes much higher income 
changes than the modified splitting.  In households with a pre-tax income between 48,600 and 
53,700 € per year, only single-earner couples face a decline in net monthly income under 
limited real income splitting.  
Regarding the income changes by number of children in the household, the pattern is as 
expected: The more children live in the household, the higher the income change under both 
individual taxation and limited real income splitting. This is due to the fact that with an 
increasing number of children, the participation rate of women and therefore also the 
distribution of household income becomes more unequal.  
                                                 
14  A similar analysis based on the 1995 income tax data is contained in Bach and Buslei (2003). 
  16Table 2—Changes in net household income for married couples resulting from a policy shift to 
separate taxation or limited real income splitting (€/month) 
 
  Individual Taxation  Limited Real Income Splitting 
  east  west  east  west 
All (mean)  -76  -202  -7  -33 
All (median)  -17  -154  0  0 
 Mean income changes by hours category
a) 
0 / 0    hours 
a)  0  -14  0  -2 
0 / 22  -50  -43  -4  -4 
0 / 40  -156  -218  -12  0 
38 / 0  -195  -339  -22  -61 
38 / 9.5  -174  -226  -32  -35 
38 / 24  -39  -68  0  0 
38 / 38  -13  -20  0  0 
38 / 47  -29  -23  0  0 
49 / 0  -285  -493  -41  -112 
49 / 9.5  -263  -347  -58  -71 
49 / 24  -69  -154  0  -11 
49 / 38  -39  -56  0  0 
49 / 47  -24  -43  0  -1 
Mean income changes by income deciles
b) 
1
st        (1010) 
b)  -38  -25  -1  -2 
2
nd    (1696)  -116  -146  -16  -23 
3
rd   (2074)  -120  -189  -16  -33 
4
th    (2391)  -57  -182  -3  -24 
5
th    (2702)  -57  -176  -2  -17 
6
th    (3025)  -39  -155  0  -13 
7
th    (3375)  -46  -154  0  -11 
8
th    (3840)  -72  -218  0  -21 
9
th    (4541)  -118  -262  -16  -41 
10
th (6463)  -165  -336  -29  -101 
Mean income change by number of children
c) 
No children 
c)  -59  -147  -3  -22 
1 child  -83  -204  -9  -31 
2 children  -73  -232  -6  -39 
3 or more children  -135  -243  -14  -45 
Notes:    a)     Hours categories of two spouses (husband / wife), see table 1, section 3. 
b)  Income deciles refer to net household income per month; numbers in parentheses refer to the  
  respective decile means for east and west Germany (in €/month).   
    c)    Number of children under 16 years living in the household. 
Source:  Own calculations, GSOEP, wave 19 (2002). 
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4.2  Labor Supply Effects 
The simulated labor supply effects of the two alternative tax reforms are summarized in Table 
3. Simulation results refer to changes in both labor force participation rates and changes in 
total hours. The corresponding labor supply effects in terms of absolute changes in the 
number of persons are given in Table 4. These numbers were derived by multiplying 
simulated percentage changes in labor force participation rates by the respective number of 
households in the GSOEP sample and their respective weighting factor. Below the point 
estimates we report their respective 95% bootstrap-confidence bands representing the 
percentiles of the empirical distribution of the estimated mean of the change in hours and 
participation rates, respectively. All estimates refer to the sample of married couples on which 
we have estimated the labor supply model, i.e. these numbers do not include the self-
employed, people younger than 20 or older than 65 years, severely disabled people and 
women on maternity leave. 
Labor supply effects caused by the two policy shifts depend on the income changes by 
hours categories and the labor supply elasticities of the various groups. Consistent with the 
pattern of these two factors, the changes in participation and in total hours worked are greater 
under individual taxation than under limited real income splitting, greater for women than for 
men and greater in the west than in eastern Germany. 
  18Table 3—Labor supply effects of a policy shift to separate taxation or limited real income 
splitting 
  Individual Taxation  Limited Real Income Splitting 
  Men  Women  Men  Women 
Change in participation rates (in percentage points) 
All households  -0.91 
(-1.07 – -0.73) 
4.85 
(4.22 – 5.66) 
  -0.17 
(-020 – - 0.15) 
 1.11 
(0.95 – 1.32) 
West, all  -1.11 




(-0.24 – 0.18) 
 1.34 
(1.14 – 1.61) 
West, without children  -0.66 
(-0.98 – 0.32) 
4.71 
(4.04 – 5.54) 
       -0.20 
(-0.25 – -0.16) 
1.21 
(1.03 – 1.46) 
West, with children  -1.28 
(-1.49 – -1.08) 
6.18 
(5.35 – 7.30) 
 -0.21 
(-0.25 – -0.18) 
 1.40 
(1.19 – 1.69) 
East, all   -0.14 
(-0.34 – 0.12) 
1.32 
(0.87 – 1.82) 
- 0.03 
(-0.05 – 0.00) 
 0.20 
(0.13 – 0.29) 
East, without children  -0.04 
(-0.37 – 0.41) 
 0.74 
(0.42 – 1.09) 
 -0.04 
(-0.82 – 0.02) 
 0.11 
(0.06 – 0.19) 
East, with children  -0.19 
(-0.37 – 0.02) 
1.59 
(1.07 – 2.17) 
- 0.03 
(-0.06 – 0.00) 
 0.24 
(0.16 – 0.35) 
Change in hours
 (in percent) 
All households  -1.82 
(-2.11 – -1.52) 
11.40 
(9.90 – 13.50) 
-0.34 
(-0.40 – -0.29) 
 2.51 
(2.16 – 3.01) 
West, all  -2.18 
(-2.53 – -1.85) 
13.64 
(11.82 – 16.27) 
-0.42 
(-0.49 – -0.36) 
3.04 
(2.60 – 3.68) 
West, without children  -1.66 
(-2.18 – -1.13) 
9.82 
(8.36 – 11.88) 
 -0.43 
(-0.53 – -0.34) 
 2.39 
(2.03 – 2.93) 
West, with children  -2.38 
(-2.72 – -2.05) 
 15.16 
(13.10 – 18.16) 
-0.41 
(-0.49 – -0.35) 
3.30 
(2.81 – 4.02) 
East, all   -0.43 
(-0.72 – -0.09) 
2.72 
(1.79 – 3.79) 
- 0.06 
(-0.10 – -0.02) 
 0.48 
(0.32 – 0.68) 
East, without children  -0.40 
(-0.92 – 0.21) 
 1.54 
(0.89 – 2.27) 
 -0.09 
(-0.17 – -0.01) 
 0.30 
(0.17 – 0.45) 
East, with children  -0.44 
(-0.69 – -0.16) 
3.26 
(2.16 – 4.54) 
- 0.05 
(-0.08 – -0.01) 
 0.56 
(0.38 – 0.80) 
Note:   Numbers in parentheses are 95% bootstrap-confidence intervals based on 1,000 replications and obtained 
by the percentile method. 
In the case of a shift to individual taxation the participation rate of married women increases 
by about 4.9 percentage points on average, where the estimated 95% confidence band lies 
between 4.2 and 5.7. In west Germany, this increase is much higher than in east Germany. 
This can be explained by the fact that the average income change in the east is only a third of 
the average income change in the west. The effects on total hours worked follow a similar 
pattern: the increase in total hours of women in west Germany is more than four times higher 
than the increase in total hours of women in the east. In total, about 430,000 women would 
  19join the labor force in case of a shift to individual taxation. A shift to limited real income 
splitting would result in much weaker labor supply effects than a shift to separate taxation. In 
total, the female labor force would increase by about 92,000 women in this scenario. The 
strongest effects can again be found in the group of women in west Germany. Labor supply 
effects of married men are much smaller than the effects on the labor supply of their spouses. 
Under both policy alternatives, husbands would reduce their total hours and also their 
participation rate would decline. This is a result of the incentive to balance the income 
distribution between the spouses under this tax regime.  
Table 4—Labor Supply effects of policy shifts in numbers of thousands  
  Individual Taxation  Modified Splitting 
  Men  Women  Men  Women 
West    -94,435 




(-21,041 – 14,448) 
88,903 
(75,855 – 106,834)
East  -2,482 
(-6,146 – 1,886) 
19,658 
(12,841 –  27,868) 
-743 
(-1,195 – -283) 
2,978 
(1,868 – 4,474) 
All households  -96,917 




(-21,875 – -15,152) 
91,881 
(78,717 – 109,725)
Note:   Numbers in parentheses are 95% bootstrap-confidence intervals based on 1,000 replications and obtained 
by the percentile method. 
 
 
5  Summary and Conclusions  
We have analyzed the potential labor supply effects of a shift from the current system of joint 
taxation of married couples with income splitting to a system of limited real income splitting, 
as it has intensively been discussed in the recent election campaign. As a benchmark case, we 
have also analyzed the potential labor supply effects of a shift to separate taxation, as it is in 
existence in some other European countries. To this end we have developed a 
microsimulation model for Germany based on an econometric labor supply model embedded 
in a detailed empirical tax-benefit model. The labor supply model assumes that married 
couples jointly maximize a household utility function with both spouses’ leisure time and net 
household income as arguments. This “household-utility” model provides, in our view, a more 
appropriate specification of actual labor supply behavior of married couples than the 
alternative specification based on the “male chauvinist” assumption which has been used in 
previous related studies on the potential labor supply effects of changes in household taxation 
in Germany. 
  20We find that a shift from the current system of full income splitting to the hypothetical 
benchmark of separate taxation of married couples would reduce average net household 
income substantially in west Germany but only little in east Germany. These regional 
differences are related to differences in labor force participation and part-time work in the two 
regions and the fact that the amount of the so-called “splitting advantage” is relatively high 
for single-earner households of married couples but shrinks quickly with an increasing share 
of wife’s income in total pre-tax household income. The second tax reform we have analyzed 
in this paper, the limited real income splitting proposal, would on average have very little 
effect on net household incomes. In fact, this tax reform would leave 50 percent of all married 
couples (in eastern Germany even 75 per cent) without income change at all. This is a 
consequence of the possibility to balance income inequalities between spouses of up to 40,000 
€  under limited real income splitting as analyzed here.  
Given these small changes in net household income and the relatively small labor 
supply elasticities of married women derived from our econometric model, it thus comes as 
no surprise that our simulation results show relatively small labor supply effects of a shift 
from the current system of full income splitting to the proposed limited real income splitting 
system.  Overall, we find that female labor supply would increase by about 90 thousand  
persons, the lion’s share of which (almost 90%) would be in west Germany. For the 
benchmark scenario of a shift to separate taxation our simulations show that about 430 
thousand housewives would be willing to take up work, about 95 percent of them living in 
west Germany. However, according to our simulation results about 100 thousand husbands 
would drop out of the labor force following a shift to separate taxation. 
The comparison of our simulation results with findings from previous studies for 
Germany (summarized in section 2.2 above) is rendered difficult by the fact that none of these 
studies simulates the reform proposal “limited real income splitting” in the way we do. Also 
the simulations of a shift to individual taxation are not comparable to our simulations, because 
these authors simulate tax revenue neutral alternatives. Only Wagenhals and Kraus (1998) 
simulate a policy shift towards separate taxation similar to our case. They get much higher 
labor supply effects than we do, which is probably due to the authors’ model specification, in 
particular the hypothesis that married couples labor supply model can be described by the 
“male chauvinist” model.  
Overall, our results show that there would be considerable labor supply reactions of 
married men and women in the case of a shift towards individual taxation in Germany. 
However, a policy reform of this extent seems rather unlikely at the moment. The more 
  21realistic alternative, namely a limitation of the current splitting advantage as simulated here, 
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  23Appendix 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Table A1: Participation rates and average working hours in the sample 
 
  east Germany  west Germany 
  Men  Women  Men  Women 
Participation rates in per cent   
All married couples  85  76  92  66 
Married couples 
without children 
78   78  87  74 
Married couples 
with children 
89  77  93  63 
Average working hours per week   
All married couples  36  27  38  17 
Married couples 
without children 
32  28  36  23 
Married couples 
with children 
37  27  39  14 
Source:  Own calculations on the basis of GSOEP (wave 19) 2002. 
Note:   In the sample shown, only married couples are included. Further, all households with head of household 
or spouse below 20 years or over 65 years are excluded, as well self-employed, students, women on 
maternity leave and pensioners. 
Table A2: Average net household income by hours category (€/month) 
 
Hours Category  
(husband’s hours / wife’s hours)  east Germany  west Germany 
0 / 0  985  1452 
0 / 22  1464  1913 
0 / 40  1763  2223 
38 / 0  1927  2771 
38 / 9,5  2235  2863 
38 / 24  2867  3573 
38 / 38  2992  3585 
38 / 47  3248  4448 
49 / 0  2480  3813 
49 / 9,5  2993  3923 
49 / 24  3192  4542 
49 / 38  3666  4605 
49 / 47  4049  5289 
Source:  Own calculations on the basis of GSOEP (wave 19) 2002. 
Note:   See note to Table A1. 
  24Appendix 2: Wage Elasticities of Labor Supply 
The quantitative implications of the labor supply model can best be summarized by hours and 
participation elasticities with respect to given percentage change in the gross wage rate.   
These elasticities can be calculated with respect to a change in the own and the spouse’s 
wage.  Although a closed-form expression of these wage elasticities is not available for the 
translog utility function estimated here, they can be calculated from the simulated change in 
estimated hours and participation rates to an exogenous change in the gross wage rate.  At 
given gross wages, the expected number of hours worked as well as the labor force 
participation rate can be calculated for each sample observation.  Comparing these values to 
the simulated hours and participation rates resulting from a given percentage change in gross 
wages yields hours and participation elasticities. In the following table we summarize our 
elasticity estimates for various population groups.   
Overall, estimated own wage elasticities are rather small:  measured by hours worked a 
1% wage increase raises labor supply by about 0.3% for wives and by about 0.2% for 
husbands. Estimated elasticities for wives living in west Germany are markedly larger than 
for east German wives. These regional differences could be related to the greater importance 
of demand-side restrictions on labor supply as a result of the still very depressed labor market 
in east Germany.  However, it could also be related to a different preference structure of east 
Germans due to their previous work experience under socialism, or to institutional 
differences. Similar differences are also observed with respect to participation elasticities. In 
contrast, cross-wage elasticities between wives and husbands are negligible in both regions 
and for all household groups considered here. This holds for both hours worked and labor 
force participation rates. 
Comparing labor supply elasticities estimated here with those from previous German 
studies is rendered difficult by differences in model specification and sample definitions. 
Overall, estimated elasticities vary greatly between the various studies but all tend to find that 
(uncompensated) wage elasticities are low for men.  For married women, estimated wage 
elasticities with respect to hours vary between zero and 1.7.  Only a few studies also report 
labor force participation elasticities, and these vary between about 0.8 and 3.3 (for summaries 
see Zimmermann, 1993, and Steiner, 2000).   
  25Table A3—Estimated labor supply elasticities for married spouses (household labor supply  
   model with translog utility function).  
  Male gross hourly wage +1%  Female gross hourly wage +1% 
  Men  Women  Men  Women 
Change in participation rates (in percentage points) 
All married couples 
0.15 
(0.13 – 0.17) 
0.00 
(-0.02 – 0.02) 
0.02 
(0.01 – 0.03) 
0.16 
(0.14 – 0.18) 
West, all 
0.15 
(0.14 – 0.18) 
-0.02 
(-0.04 – 0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01 – 0.02) 
0.17 
(0.15 – 0.20) 
without children 
0.19 
(0.16 – 0.21) 
-0.02 
(-0.04 – 0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00 – 0.02) 
0.17 
(0.14 – 0.19) 
with children 
0.14 
(0.12 – 0.16) 
-0.01 
(-0.04 – 0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01 – 0.02) 
0.18 
(0.16 – 0.21) 
East, all  
0.13 
(0.09 – 0.17) 
0.05 
(0.03 – 0.06) 
0.04 
(0.03 – 0.06) 
0.10 
(0.07 – 0.13) 
without children 
0.18 
(0.13 – 0.23) 
0.05 
(0.03 – 0.07) 
0.06 
(0.03 – 0.08) 
0.09 
(0.07 – 0.12) 
with children 
0.10 
(0.07 – 0.14) 
0.04 
(0.03 – 0.06) 
0.03 
(0.02 – 0.05) 
0.10 
(0.07 – 0.12) 
Change in hours
 (in percent) 
All married couples 
0.24 
(0.22 – 0.28) 
-0.03 
(-0.08 – 0.02) 
0.02 
(0.01 – 0.03) 
0.41 
(0.36 – 0.47) 
West, all 
0.25 
(0.23 – 0.29) 
-0.05 
(-0.12 – 0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00 – 0.02) 
0.45 
(0.40 – 0.53) 
without children 
0.30 
(0.26 – 0.36) 
-0.08 
(-0.13 - -0.03) 
0.02 
(-0.01 – 0.03) 
0.40 
(0.35 – 0.46) 
with children 
0.24 
(0.21 – 0.27) 
-0.04 
(-0.11 – 0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01 – 0.02) 
0.48 
(0.42 – 0.55) 
East, all 
0.20 
(0.14 – 0.26) 
0.08 
(0.04 – 0.11) 
0.06 
(0.04 – 0.08) 
0.23 
(0.17 – 0.29) 
without children 
0.29 
(0.21 – 0.38) 
0.07 
(0.03 – 0.11) 
0.09 
(0.05 – 0.13) 
0.21 
(0.16 – 0.28) 
with children 
0.16 
(0.11 – 0.21) 
0.08 
(0.04 – 0.11) 
0.05 
(0.03 – 0.07 
0.24 
(0.18 – 0.30) 
Note:   Numbers in parentheses are 95% bootstrap-confidence intervals based on 1,000 replications and obtained 
by the percentile method. 
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